Introduction
Are venture capital (VC)-backed Initial Public Offering (IPO) firms less financially distressed than other IPO firms, and if so, do VCs contribute to the financial stability of portfolio companies after the IPO? If VC investors do reduce financial risk of investee firms, is this risk-reduction caused by VCs' screening of portfolio companies, or by the direct effect of VC investments in reducing financial risk? Stated differently, is there a relationship between the VCs' value-added intensity and the level of a post-IPO firm's financial distress? Finally, are certain types of VC firms (high reputation vs. low reputation and bank affiliated vs. independent) better at reducing the financial distress risk of investee firms than other ones? These questions have long been empirically debated, but have picked up impetus in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which emphasized the need for managers and regulators to keep the risk-taking of financial institutions and public companies at reasonable levels.
There are at least three arguments supporting the idea that VCs contribute to financial market stability by bringing public firms that show a lower risk of financial distress during the post-IPO period.
First, VCs undertake an intensive screening and selection process in order to pick "winning firms" that have favorable future business prospects (Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Baum and Silvermann, 2004; Ueda, 2004; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011) . The screening process involves selecting firms with specific characteristics that should lead to a lower risk of financial distress during the post-investment period (screening effect). The selection of firms with a low risk of financial distress should be even more pronounced in the case of captive VCs (mainly bank-affiliated and corporate VCs), which tend to be more risk-adverse than independent VCs (Manigart, de Waele, Wright, Robbie, Desbrières, Sapienza, and Beekman, 2002;  Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto, 2015) . Indeed, independent VCs have a high risk tolerance and pursuing higher capital gains preserves their future ability to raise funding from third parties. Captive VCs have
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3 less pressure to maximize investment returns because they can raise additional funds from the parent company they are affiliated with.
Second, VCs supply portfolio firms with the equity capital needed to expand their business, and enable firms to have a robust capital structure to meet any contracted principal and interest payments (financial effect) (Kaplan, and Schoar, 2005; Croce, Martí, and Murtinu, 2013) . Finally, VCs are also builders of "winning firms" because they add value to portfolio firms by providing them with coaching (Jain and Kini, 1995; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Croce, Martí, and Murtinu, 2013; Cumming, Grilli, and Murtinu, 2014) , effective monitoring (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Cumming, 2005; Cumming, Grilli, and Murtinu, 2014) , and valuable business contacts (Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2008; Wang and Wang, 2012) . As a result, the level of financial soundness of firms brought public with VC-backing is likely to be higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, even though their financial soundness at the VC's investment date might well be analogous to that of non-VC-backed firms (value-added effect) . This should be even more true for companies backed by high reputable VCs, as several studies (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Nahata, 2008; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) document that more reputable VCs are able to select better-quality firms and exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their investee firms.
Despite the arguments discussed above, the nature of the relationship between the VC-backing and the IPOs' risk of financial distress may be unclear since there are at least two reasons to expect VC backing to be associated with bringing riskier firms public. The first explanation is the certification effect (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) , which predicts that VCs, especially those with a high reputation, make it easier for portfolio firms to obtain external financing, such as equity investment or bank debt financing (Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto, 2015) . The presence of a multi-billion dollar venture debt market 1 that 1 Venture debt is a type of debt financing provided to VC-backed firms by specialized lenders to fund working capital or capital expenses. Unlike traditional bank loans, venture debt is available to startups and growth firms that do not have positive cash flows or significant assets to use as collateral. Although quantitative data about venture debt industry are hard to come by, venture debt is commonly used for start-up capital structures (Ibrahim, 2010) . VC-backed companies such as Google and Facebook have used venture in their capital structures to gain first-tomarket advantage and to minimize the need to obtain expensive and scarce (at the time) external equity financing.
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We next estimate OLS regressions, testing whether a firm's financial distress risk is a function of a dummy variable for VC-backing and various other firm-specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and industry and state dummies. Consistent with the univariate analysis, we document significantly different risks of financial distress between VC-and non-VC-backed IPOs, which is robust to all the financial distress measures used. This result, however interesting on its own, emphasizes the need to determine whether the lower risk of financial distress risk for VC-backed IPOs comes from the VCs' screening role only, or from the financial effect and value-added effect as well (henceforth, we will use "treatment effect" to refer to both financial effect and value-added effect). The use of OLS estimations does not allow us to address this issue because as the provision and receipt of venture funding represents the result of an endogenous choice by firms and VCs, as Sørensen (2007) clearly shows, which is reflected not only in the investment by VCs but also in their eventual exit. This suggests a nonrandom distribution and characteristics of VC-backed IPOs (Lee and Wahal, 2004) . Thus, we employ a matching technique, where the one-to-one nearest neighbor is matched without replacement (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) , which allows us to control for observed heterogeneity among treated and untreated firms, represented by the characteristics included in the matching process. This approach starts with the estimation of a logit model for the endogenous choice variable (VC=1 for VC backing, 0, otherwise) with a vector of X variables (age, size, 2-digit SIC code dummies, headquarters-state dummies). Then, the predicted probability is used as the propensity score and each VC-backed IPO is matched with the non-VC-backed IPO with the closest propensity score. Once selection bias is controlled for, we estimate OLS regressions. Consistent with our previous results documenting the positive effects of the role of VCbacking in IPOs, we find a negative causal effect of VC financing on the risk of financial distress for firms receiving such financing. In so doing, we document the VC-backed IPOs are less financial distressed than other IPOs due to the treatment effects.
Since the propensity score matching analysis is not without flaws-specifically, it does not control for the effect of unobserved factors-we perform two robustness tests in order to check the resilience of our results. First, we include in the OLS specification the lagged dependent variable to
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6 predict the current year's value of the dependent variable (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Tykvová and Borrell, 2012) . Indeed, if VC funding is itself a result of unobserved factors related to financial distress risk, controlling for lagged financial distress risk should eliminate spurious effects resulting from such endogeneity. One again, we document a negative relationship between VC backing and the risk of financial distress for IPO firms.
Second, while restricting the analysis to the VC-backed IPOs, we examine the effect of VC investment intensity (measured as both the length of the investment and the presence or absence of a VC syndication) on the level of a firm's financial distress and find that the level of financial distress declines as VC investment intensity increases. This result, which is resilient to all the financial distress measures, enables us to provide further evidence in favor of the treatment effect hypothesis.
Since VC investments have favorable effects on the IPOs' risk of financial distress, and as various studies (e.g., Lee and Wahal, 2004; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) have pointed out that more reputable VCs are able to better solve their role compared to low reputable ones, it is really
interesting to know what is the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress.
Using a reputation measure based on the VC firm's funding market share, we find that companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit higher levels of financial distress risk than others. Furthermore, implementing a standard Heckman (1979) 2-step selection procedure we report results that are robust to the correction of selection bias possibly induced by VC firms' choice of investee companies. Since these results are somewhat unexpected, we analyze them further by decomposing the Z"-score. Similar to Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) , we find that companies backed by more reputable VCs perform better than others. However, we document that this success comes, at least partially, from more aggressive investment (lower liquidity assets on total assets ratio) and financing policy (lower capital ratio). Indeed, greater investments in long-term assets and greater use of debt financing are associated with higher operating performance and profitably, respectively, but also higher risk of financial distress.
We perform an additional analysis by distinguishing and evaluating the impact of the different types of VCs. Following several studies (e.g., Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto, 2015), we split the VC-
backed IPOs sample into firms backed by bank affiliated VCs and firms backed by independent VCs. We find that bank affiliated VC-backed IPOs are safer compared to independent VC-backed IPOs. This result suggests that bank affiliated VCs are interested in the long-term growth of their portfolio firms in order to yield synergies with their core banking business (Hellman, Lindsey and Puri, 2008 Our paper complements previous research on the role of VC backing in IPOs. 2 Existing studies find that investee firms are more likely to go public (Sørensen, 2007) ; obtain higher valuation and attract more reputable financial market players during the IPO process (Ivanov and Xie, 2010) ; show better performance in term of profitability (Jain and Kini, 1995) , long-run market returns (Brav and Gompers, 1997) , and innovation (Cumming, 2007; Caselli, Gatti and Perrini, 2009 ) over the post-IPO period. While this literature is consistent with the notion that VC-are better than non-VC-backed firms in many aspects, our paper shows for the first time that VC-backed firms have lower risk of financial distress. However, we are aware of the fact that, as with other research (Jain and Kini, 1995; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011) , our study suffers from a lack of observational data on the behavior of VC-backed firms during the pre-IPO period. A recent paper by Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto (2015) also investigates the relationship between 2 Since there is a greater amount of information available for IPO firms, the impact on investee firms by VC investments exiting via IPOs have traditionally been more frequently studied in academic work than other VC investments (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006) . 3 It is worth noting that we do not observe private firms' risk of financial distress risk because in the US, only the approximately 15,000 SEC registrants plus certain regulated entities and firms for which lenders or contracts impose such requirements have publicly available financial statements (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2013) . Thus, financial data for U.S. private firms have not been widely accessible. M A N U S C R I P T
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8 VC investments and risk of financial distress for investee firms, demonstrating that VC-backed firms, particularly those backed by bank-affiliated VC investors, exhibit a significant increase in both debt exposure and risk of financial distress after the VC financing. Our study differs from theirs in several ways. First, Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto (2015) focus on a relatively narrow sample of small and micro firms. 4 Analyzing the role of VC in mitigating the risk of financial distress in IPO firms is fundamentally different from studying its impact on small and micro firms. Indeed, the risk of financial distress for IPO firms is of great importance given their large systemic relevance and the potential repercussion on financial market stability. Furthermore, the performance of an IPO firm has implications for a larger number of stakeholders (thousands of retail investors, institutional investors, underwriters, firm's auditors, financial analysts and board members). Second, Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto (2015) focus on European VC-backed firms. We believe that analyzing the US VC market has the following strengths.
First, US VC investments account for a large portion of the global VC industry and VCs invest much larger funds in the US than in Europe. 5 As such, studies focused on US market suffer fewer generalization concerns than those focused on European market. Second, US VCs are more active, skilled and experienced than their European counterparts (Schwienbacher, 2008; Hege, Palomino, and Schwienbacher, 2009) . As a consequence, their investment decisions should be more aligned with theoretical predictions and should help scholars to better explain differences in performance and risk of financial distress between VC-and non-VC-backed firms. Third, the Croce, D 'Adda, and Ughetto (2015) study is limited to distinguishing between bank-affiliated and independent VCs, we also provide evidence on VC reputation, showing that the greater success of highly-reputable firms, widely documented by previous studies (e.g., Nahata, 2008) , depends on more aggressive investment and financing policy. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the research design. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 introduces further evidence on impact of VC's reputation on firm's financial distress risk and the final section concludes.
Research design
Data and Sample
Our sample consists of VC-and non-VC-backed IPOs that went public on US markets between 1990 and 2007. We first determine whether a firm has been subject to a VC financing from THOMSON ONE database, which contains information on mergers and acquisitions, VC and buy-out transactions, and VC investor exit route. This yields an initial sample of 2,413 VC-backed IPOs. Second, we exclude financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds-due to the fact that they are not directly comparable to industrial and other service firms (Mazzola and Marchisio, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Martinez, Stohr, and Quiroga, 2007) ; nonprofit companies -social clubs, sports clubs, and schools (Martinez, Stohr, and Quiroga, 2007) ; and IPOs with an offer price of less than $5.00 and amount offered of less than $3 million (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1994; Lee and Wahal, 2004 ).
This yields a reduced sample of 942 VC-backed firms. Third, we match the rest of the sample with COMPUSTAT using the ticker symbol to extract accounting data for companies going public; this procedure rejects an additional 357 VC-backed IPOs lacking a valid ticker symbol. Fourth, we extract all other IPOs in COMPUSTAT meeting the data screens detailed above, which yields the potential universe of untreated sample of non-VC-backed IPOs. We then exclude companies for which we do not find complete accounting information for at least one fiscal year after the listing (the sample includes financial data for up to five years after the listing).
The decision to exclude firms without full data exposes us to a trade-off between sample size and panel balance. On one hand, the non-exclusion of IPOs affected by missing value and without accounting information would allow us to have a bigger sample in term of number of observations. On the other hand, this would exclude the possibility of having a balanced panel. There is also a trade-off between the 
Endogenity issues and descriptive statistics
Consistent with the fact that the VCs tend to have a special appetite both for certain sectors and geographic areas 6 , the VCs' choice of target firm is not the result of a random selection process. Megginson and Weiss (1991, p. 882) 6.58%) and Massachusetts (VC: 10.50%; non-VC: 3.46%)-represent over 50% of the VC-backed IPOs subsample and 30% of non-VC-backed IPOs, respectively. Panel C shows the sample distribution of VCand non-VC-backed IPOs for each calendar year. The distribution is consistent with "hot issue markets" (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984) influencing firms to go public at non-random times. Instead, both VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies prefer to go public during particularly favorable periods, 
Propensity score matching
We now turn to estimating the effect of VC investments on firms' financial distress after the IPO.
One crucial aspect in the construction of the counterfactual sample is the selection of a valid control group. Many sample statistics shown in Table 2 are in line with previous US studies addressing VC.
Specifically, some authors (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Megginson, 2004) report similar industry and geographic concentrations, while others (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Lee and Wahal, 2004) highlight differences in characteristics of VC-and non-VC-backed IPOs. As already discussed, this is consistent with the belief that VCs tend to specialize both by sector and geographic area.
We employ a methodology that accounts for endogenous choice in matching, allowing causal inference in non-experimental settings. We define 1 as a one-year measure of financial distress risk for an IPO firm with VC backing, 0 as a one-year measure of financial distress risk for the same IPO firm without VC backing, and define VC as a dummy variable set equal to 1 for VC-backed IPO firms and zero otherwise. Our interest is focused on the difference 1 − 0 , but this result is unobservable for a single firm because a firm either receives VC backing or does not. Therefore, the most important information comes from estimating the average VC effect at a full-sample level. In formal terms, we are interested in ( 1 − 0 | = 1, ), which is equal to:
where X is a set of variables that represent firm and industry characteristics. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, VCs tend to specialize both by sector and industry, so we must control for the screening and selection process performed in order to choose the best target firm (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) .
Consequently, VC investments are not random, and randomization of treatment is unrealizable. So, applying this procedure means confronting a bias, formally defined as:
To ameliorate this bias, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the propensity score approach. This method requires the estimation of a logit model for the endogenous choice variable (VC=1 for VC backing, zero otherwise) with a vector of X variables. In other words, the purpose of this matching approach is to find a comparable firm that has similar characteristics of a VC-backed IPO firm, but differing in that VCs have no equity positions in it.
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The procedure that we employ is as follows. First, we choose the endogenous dependent variable on the propensity score model, the dummy variable VC. Second, we choose the independent variables of the model: Age, Total Assets, Industry dummies based on 2-digit SIC code, and firms' headquarters-state dummies. Third, we run a logit regression, based on the accounting data in the year of the IPO, to calculate the firm's propensity score. As a result, we obtain 1,593 propensity scores: one for each firm.
Finally, after imposing a strict radius equal to ±0.01 propensity score unit and by applying the "radius matching" criterion (Becker and Ichino, 2002) , for each VC-backed firm we choose the matching firm which falls within the radius just described, utilizing the procedure without replacement (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) . This methodology permits us to match each VC-backed IPO with one or more non-VC-backed IPO(s). However, in our case, we never find more than one matching firm for each VCbacked IPO. This leads to a state that in our case, the "radius matching" is exactly equivalent to the "nearest-neighbor matching" methodology. In addition, we check whether the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control and VC group (balancing property). 7 Formally, the matching criterion can be written as follows:
where C is the control firm; i is VC-backed IPO firm; j is non-VC-backed IPO firm; and r is the radius.
Consequently, we obtain a sample composed of 316 VC-matched with 316 non-VC-backed IPO firms.
This strict selection criterion leads us to exclude 122 companies (438 minus 316) because no comparable match is found. In other words, no one comparable falls in the range imposed by us. (D in our case is equal to VC). Lemma 2. Unconfoundedness given the propensity score. Suppose that assignment to treatment is unconfounded; 1 , 0 ⊥ | . Then assignment to treatment is not confounded given the propensity score, 1 , 0 ⊥ | ( ). If the Balancing Hypothesis of Lemma 1 is satisfied, observations with the same propensity score must have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independently of treatment status. In other words, for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and therefore treated and control units should be on average observationally identical. Any standard probability model can be used to estimate the propensity score.
[…]".
In addition, as a further control, we employ a matching process with replacement that is based on a kernel estimator that uses a distribution to specify weights. Specifically, we use a Gaussian Kernel distribution where each VC-backed IPO is matched with one or more non-VC-backed IPOs, with the propensity score approach calculating the difference between the financial distress risk measures of a VCbacked IPO and the matched non-VC backed IPO(s). We use bootstrapped standard errors to conduct statistical inference. The bootstrapping is based on 50 replications. We also calculate selection-biasadjusted 95% confidence intervals. The results are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 about here***
***Insert
Empirical methodology
Financial Distress Risk Measures
Aside from the Equity Ratio variable, all the financial distress risk measures used in this study are the result of a maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) 8 of a conditional logit model, as used in the Zmijewski (1984) and Ohlson (1980) models, and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)
9
, as used by Altman, Hartzell and Peck (1995) . 10 Two reasons motivate the use of these models. The first is simplicity 8 Assume that is a vector of predictors for the n-th observation; assume that δ is a set of unknown parameters and assume that P( ; ) is the probability of bankruptcy corresponding to given values of and δ. The log-likelihood function of any specific outcomes is given by:
now, the assessment parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function, i.e. by solving max ( ). 9 Discriminant analysis is used to classify cases into one or more groups of populations on the basis of a set variables measured on each case. The populations are known by the scholar to be distinct and to which each individual belongs. The discriminant function is the linear combination of the independent variables that will best discriminate between the a priori identified groups. Discrimination is achieved by finding the linear combination that maximizes the differences between the groups. With n observations and p independent variables, 1 < i < p and 1 < k < m, the discriminant function, can be written as follows:
= + 1 1 + 2 2 + … +
where Z'' is the discriminant Z''-score calculated using the j-th discriminant function on the k-th observation; α is the intercept, v i is the discriminant weight for independent variable i, and Xij is the i-th independent variable measured on the k-th observation. In general, this technique is most used for more-than-two groups. Vice versa, logistic regression is most common when there are only two groups. 10 We use Z" -score that was introduced for both non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors. The variables of the Z"-score are similar of those of Z-score model with the exclusion of the sales/total assets in order to filter the of computation, since all three measures primarily use accounting data that are easily retrieved from or become smaller than total debt, after which the firm becomes insolvent and eventually bankrupt. As function from the possible distortion related to the sector. For this reason, we use Z''-score rather than Z-score that is solely limited to manufacturing corporations. However, as robustness check, we perform all the elaborations also on Z-score. The results are qualitatively the same. 11 In other words, Zmijewski states that previous studies are affected by at least two kinds of biases. The first bias results from oversampling distressed firms compared to non-distressed firms, having, in this way, a final sample poorly matched with reality (choice-based sample biases). The second bias results from using a complete data sample selection criterion, where the data for distressed firms are notoriously incomplete (sample selection biases).
noted, a higher value of the Z"-score indicates a lower financial distress risk. 12 The ZM-score model (Zmijewski, 1984 ) is estimated as:
where NI is net income; TA total assets; TL total liabilities; CA current assets; and CL current liabilities. A
higher Zmijewski-score value indicates higher financial distress risk. The O-score model (Ohlson, 1980) is estimated as: 
where TA is total assets; TL total liabilities; WC working capital; CL current liabilities; CA current assets; − is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if total liabilities are higher than total assets, and 0 otherwise; NI is net income; FFO funds from operations; and is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the company realized a net loss in the last two years, zero otherwise. A higher O-score value is associated with a higher financial distress risk. The Equity ratio is estimated simply as:
This is equivalent to Leverage -1 and is simply the book value of total equity (BV) normalized by total assets (TA). As argued by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) , a high level of leverage is one of the primary causes of financial distress. The Equity ratio completes our measures of financial distress risk measures.
A higher value of the Equity ratio indicates lower financial distress risk. Table 4 about here***
***Insert
Specification models
In order to correctly evaluate the impact of VC financing on a company's financial distress risk,
we base the multivariate analysis on two steps that differ depending on the sample composition.
Specifically, we first run OLS on the panel data for estimating the Model 1 which is specified as follows:
where i denotes a firm ( i = 1, 2, …, 1,593). In our first round of the analysis, we consider the full sample as an experimental setting (1,593 IPOs) composed of 438 VC-backed IPOs and 1,155 non-VC-backed
IPOs as reported in the data and sample section. Here t denotes the time dimension represented by the five fiscal years after the listing year (t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); y denotes the financial distress risk measures (Z"-score, ZM-score, O-score, Equity ratio); VC is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for VC backed IPOs firms and 0 otherwise; X is a vector of control variables; and ε is the random error term. Second, we attempt to deal with the endogeneity concerns that affect our initial sample (see section 2.2), by estimating model 1 using a subsample composed of 316 VC-backed IPOs matched with 316 non-VCbacked IPOs, as described in section 2.3. Variable definitions are reported in the appendix as Table A1 . 
Econometric results
Impact of VC backing on IPO firm financial distress risk
less, except for O-score) by firm age. Unsurprisingly, the set of dummy variables describing industrial sectors, territorial differences and time periods contribute significantly to explaining IPO firms' risk of financial distress. In contrast, the coefficient of Capex is almost never significant.
Regarding the impact of VC backing on the risk of financial distress of IPO firms, we find, in line with the univariate analysis, that VC-backed IPO firms exhibit significantly lower risk of financial distress than do non-VC backed IPOs (at the 1% confidence level or less). In terms of Z"-score and
Equity ratio, the coefficient of VC variable is positive (in columns II and IV: 2.537 and 0.086, respectively) and highly significant (in columns II and IV: 2.59 and 3.60, respectively). In terms of ZMscore and O-score, the coefficient of the VC variable is negative (in columns VI and VIII: -0.719 and -0.744, respectively) and significant (in columns VI and VIII: -3.35 and -3.14, respectively). As such, our earlier empirical results are consistent with both the screening hypothesis and the treatment effect hypothesis (financial effect plus value-added effect).
Having documented that VC-backed IPO firms display a lower risk of financial distress than do other IPOs, the second step of our analysis aims to satisfy the need to determine whether this result comes from the VCs' screening role or the treatment effect (or from both). Following previous researchers (Lee and Wahal, 2004; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Croce, D'Adda, and Ughetto, 2015) , we implement the propensity score matching-based analysis to properly evaluate the treatment effect in OLS estimation, net of the screening, since this method allows us to control for observed heterogeneity among treated (VC-backed) and untreated (non-VC-backed) firms, represented by the characteristics included in the matching process. As highlighted in section 2.3, a matching estimator contributes to solving the selection bias problem by picking, for each VC-backed firm that receives VC financing in year t, the non-VC-backed firm that in the same year t has the most similar probability (the closest propensity score) of receiving VC. Table 6 presents the results of the propensity score matching-based analysis. Results discussed here suggest that the lower risk of financial distress of VC-backed IPO firms depends not only on the VCs' screening ability but also on the financial and non-financial services they provide to the backed firms. As observed by Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011), one possible limitation of the propensity score matching analysis is that it does not control for the effect of unobserved factors (such as a brilliant business idea) on the selection of firms that get VC financing. As such, in section 4.4 we perform robustness checks to further confirm our results about the impact of VC backing on the risk of financial distress of IPOs.
***Insert
The risk of financial distress and the cost of debt
A question raised by the results of the previous section is whether or not the lower financial distress risks by VC-backed IPOs results in a lower cost of debt. In this section, we attempt to provide an answer by conducting a test on the sample chosen through propensity score approach. Table 7 reports medians of the Interest Ratio (total interest paid on total debt) both for VC-backed IPOs sample and for the respective control IPO firms. The analysis is conducted by distinguishing between the best and the worst firms. Specifically, concerning Z''-score, firms are grouped into three ranges on the basis of the A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Megginson and Weiss (1991) .
Distinguishing between bank affiliated and independent VCs
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In this section we evaluating the impact of the different types of VCs. Specifically, we split the VC-backed IPOs sample in two: firms backed by bank affiliated VCs and firms backed by independent
VCs. In a case where a company going public is backed by VC syndication, we focus on the lead VC, the VC with the highest equity stake in an IPO company as of the listing date (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007) . Once the lead VC is identified from IPO PROSPECTUSES, we gather the information about its nature from THOMSONE ONE. Hence, we build two dummy variables to distinguish between different
VCs. Specifically, we set Bank VC to 1 when firms are backed by a bank affiliated VC and to zero otherwise. Conversely, we set Independent VC to 1 when firms are backed by independent VC and to zero otherwise. To account for selection bias issues discussed previously, we conduct the testing using the sample generated by the propensity score matching approach.
13 Table 8 presents the results of estimating the impact of VC type on the risk of financial distress of IPO firms using the baseline models of the previous section. Specifically, Columns I, III, V and VII report the results of estimating the impact of being financed by bank affiliated VC on the risk of financial distress for IPO firms and various other firm-specific characteristics, and macroeconomic-specific variation. Conversely, Columns II, IV, VI and VIII refer to the same estimations but the aim is to capture the impact of being financed by an independent VC. 
***Insert
.] having made a venture capital investment significantly increases a bank's chances of financing that company in the loan market. […]
companies may benefit from this relationship through lower loan pricing".
Robustness check
This section presents the main results of two additional robustness checks that further investigate whether VC financing causally impacts the financial risk of VC-backed IPOs. First, we estimate OLS with one lagged value of the dependent variable to account for the possibility that our empirical models of IPO firms' financial distress risk suffer from specification bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. In unreported results, we find that the effects of VC backing on the risk of financial distress remain substantially unchanged.
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23 Second, we restrict the analysis to VC-backed firms and specify a linear model to verify whether the firm's financial distress varies across IPO firms according to the effectiveness of VC investments.
Indeed, if the VC treatment effect hypothesis is true, we would expect that VC-backed firms characterized by higher VC investment intensity should exhibit lower risk of financial distress. Following various papers (Jain and Kini, 1995; Wang, Wang and Lu, 2003; Tian, 2012) , we measure the intensity of a VC investment through two indicators: (a) the length of time between the induction of the first VC to the board of directors and the IPO (LI), and (b) the VC syndication dummy (Syndication)
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, which is a variable assuming the value of 1 for firms in which pre-IPO shareholding were two or more VC investors.
The idea behind the use of LI is that the longer the investment period, the greater the opportunities VCs have to add value to portfolio firms and influence their actions. Furthermore, we use Syndication because when VC investors form a syndicate to co-invest in a project, syndicate members who have heterogeneous skills, information, industry expertise, and networks can provide a broad range of inputs for entrepreneurial firms (Tian, 2012) . Overall, our results, that are omitted here for sake of brevity, confirm the idea that the greater the VC investments intensity, the lower the risk that an IPO firm will encounter financial distress, again suggesting a negative causal relationship between VC financing and the risk of financial distress for firms receiving such financing.
The impact of VC's reputation on firm's financial distress risk
We next analyze the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress. This issue is of special interest because previous studies (e.g., Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) indicate that all VC firms are not equal: companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit superior post-IPO operative performance compared to those backed by less reputable VCs. This result has a twofold explanation. First, VCs with a high reputation have a greater ability to select better-quality portfolio firms and provide them with more valuable advisory and monitoring services. Secondly, less reputable VCs can 14 The data are hand collected from IPO prospectuses (for the year of the offering), retrieved from the filing section of THOMSON ONE. We set the dummy variable Syndication on 1 if at the time of offering there are more than one VC with equity position in the target firm, and 0 otherwise.
have strong incentives to "grandstand" by taking weak firms public too early (see Gompers, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004) . As such, it appears imperative not only to observe how these companies perform after the IPO, but also determine their level of financial distress risk.
VC Reputation Measure
Taking inspiration from other studies that have investigated the impact of VC's reputation on portfolio firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Nahata, 2008 In a case where a company going public is backed by a VC syndication, we focus on the lead VC's reputation--the reputation of the VC with highest equity stake in the IPO company as of the listing date (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007) . 16 However, our approach differs slightly from previous studies (Nahata, 2008; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011 ) that use the median value to classify VCs into high and low reputation classes. Our choice is motivated by the fact that VC fund-raising is highly concentrated among a few VC firms. This is clearly seen by observing the list of Top 100 VCs published annually by Entrepreneur magazine, where huge spread in terms of market share are observed between the first and hundredth VC firm. Consistently, we find that VC funds raised are highly concentrated among the top 50 VC firms in THOMSON ONE data. 15 As empirically shown by Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jørgensen (2014) , the VCs' track record affect their capability to raise new funds. The explanation of this result arises by considering that limited partners (LPs) increase their appetite, propensity, to entrust new funds to general partners (GPs) on the basis of past success of these latter. 16 The information apt to identify the lead VC investor and its stake is retrieved from IPO PROSPECTUSES.
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For example, in 2000 the cumulative value of funds raised in the five previous years by the first hundred VC firms is about 50% of the total funds raised by the entire VC industry, composed of about 3,000 VC firms. This statistic remains substantially unchanged over time. Therefore, in the presence of such a concentrated industry, the use of median value as the parameter of discrimination between high and low reputable VC firms seems inappropriate. 17 As the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress can also depend on how large an equity stake the VC firm has in the IPO company at the listing date, we construct the variable VC Reputation_x_Stake, which is the product of VC Reputation-FR and lead VC's Stake of equity in the portfolio firm as of the listing date.
Differences in outcomes among VC-backed firms: High and Low reputation VCs
In this section, we investigate the differences in the financial distress risk measures between firms backed by high and low reputation VCs. Specifically, our investigation process proceeds as follows. First,
we verify the quality of our VC's reputation variable. We do so by analyzing the impact of VC reputation on firm financial performance. As suggested by Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011, p. 1327 Krishnan and Nandy (2011) define VCs with a market share of funds raised being above the sample median as highly reputable and low reputation VCs as those below the sample median. 18 In unreported tests, we also run the regressions by considering as dependent variable both ROA and Ebitda/Assets. Consistent with expectations, we find that being backed by a highly reputable VC is strongly positive for a firm's
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26 results are not novel (Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011) and, as such, should not need further interpretation. We refer to them merely as a test of the correctness of our VC reputation measure. **** Insert Table 9 about here ****
We next focus on the role of VC reputation in explaining post-IPO risk of financial distress.
Panels A and B of Table 10 about here***
VC screening and VC impact on investee firms: Disentangling the effects
The coefficient estimates in Table 10 may be affected by selection bias arising out of the likely matching of better portfolio companies with more reputable VC firms. As a result, the risk of financial distress of VC-backed firms may be attributable to their characteristics rather than VCs' reputation effect.
In order to control for this kind of endogeneity, we use Heckman's (1979) correction procedure. In a 1st
operating performance. Specifically, we run the regressions once with dummy variable VC Reputationand and once with variable VC Reputation_x_Stake, and the coefficients are always significantly different fro zero at 1% level. 19 As a robustness check we also measure VC reputation using a dummy that takes value 1 if the VC firm, for the corresponding time window, is among the top 100 VC firms for market share and zero otherwise. The results, that are not reported for brevity, are substantially unchanged. where y is the financial distress risk measure, and the Market Share VC Firm is the market share of the VC firm for funds raised five year prior to the listing of the corresponding backed firm. This is the endogenous covariate. The Inverse Mills ratio captures the likelihood that highly reputable VCs are more likely to select better quality portfolio firms compared to low reputation ones. Table 11 presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients. As is standard, all control variables in the second step equation are also included in the first step. According to our arguments the IVs are positively and significantly related to VC Reputation. The explanatory power of the first-stage models is sufficiently high, as the Adjusted R squared value is 27.52%. Since Market Share VC Firm continues to have significant negative associations with Z"-score and Equity ratio and significant positive association with ZM-score and O-Score, we conclude that the higher financial distress risk exhibited by companies backed by more reputable VCs is due to how these investors perform their monitoring role.
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The second step regressions also indicate VC selectivity does not matter, since the Inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant for all of the issuer financial distress risk measures. Table 11 about here***
***Insert
Why are more reputable VCs associated with higher risk of financial distress?
Taken as a whole, the results discussed above are somewhat unexpected, because previous studies shed light on the benefits deriving from highly reputable VC investments. As such, we consider it appropriate to delve deeper into this issue by investigating the impact of VC reputation on the determinants of financial distress risk indicator. 20 Thus, we re-estimate the regression model in Table 10 , after replacing the dependent variable with the components of Z"-score, one by one. As reported in Table   12 , we find that VC Reputation is: (i) negatively correlated with the working capital on total assets ratio (at the 1% confidence level); (ii) negatively related with the retained earnings on total assets ratio (at the 10% confidence level); (iii) positively related with the EBIT on total assets ratio (at the 10% confidence level or less); (iv) negatively related to capital ratio (at 1% confidence level). Table 12 about here*** In summary, according to Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) , we find that companies backed by more reputable VC-backed firms perform better than others, but we also document that this success comes, at least partially, from more aggressive investment (lower proportion of current assets on total assets) and financing policy (lower capital ratio). Indeed, the greater the investments in long-term assets and the use of debt financing, the higher the operating performance and shareholders' profitably, but also the higher the risk of financial distress. As such, while our additional evidence seems to be consistent with the certification theory (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) , which predict that companies backed by more reputable VCs are more likely to obtain external financing, such as bank debt financing.
***Insert
21
20 We warmly thank Edward Altman for this precious suggestion. 21 Leaving unchanged the criteria discussed along the paragraph 5, we construct an addition measure of VC' reputation based on the assets under management (AUM) and replicate all the analysis presented. The results are qualitatively the same. We do not present them here for brevity reasons but they are available upon request.
Conclusions
Our paper analyzes the effects of VC investments on the risk of financial distress of portfolio firms. Using a sample of 1,593 US IPOs between 1990 and 2007, we examine whether VC-backed IPO firms are less financially distressed after going public than others and whether the risk of financial distress varies across investee firms according to reputation and type of VC firms. We present several results.
First, after controlling for other determinants of a firm's risk of financial distress such as size and age, we find VC backed IPOs exhibit a lower risk of financial distress than do non-VC backed IPOs. This result, which can be consistent with either the screening hypothesis or the treatment hypothesis, or both, is robust to all the financial distress measures used (Z"-score; ZM-score; O-score; and Equity ratio).
Second, we disentangle the screening and treatment effects of VC backing by using propensity score matching, and find that the lower risk of financial distress of VC-backed IPO firms depends both on how VC investors select their investments (screening ability), and on the business support (financial and nonfinancial) they provide to a portfolio firm. This result is robust to checks for possible limitations of the propensity score matching analysis. Third, we find that as the financial risk decreases the cost of debt decreases as well, though VC-backed IPOs always show a lower cost of debt compared to others. Fourth, we find that companies backed by more reputable VCs exhibit higher levels of financial distress risk even when they show superior operating performance. This result, which is robust to the correction of selection bias concerns, appears related to VCs' capital structure choices (high use of debt) and investment selection (illiquid asset choices). Finally, we find that bank affiliated VC-backed IPOs are safer compared to independent VC-backed IPOs, consistent with the idea that bank affiliated VCs are interested in a longterm success of their portfolio firms in attempt to yields synergies with the banking core business.
Our study contributes to recent policy discussions about the increasing risk of financial markets.
Policymakers and regulators are afraid that IPOs may produce adverse effects on the financial system as a whole by transferring too much risk from entrepreneurs and institutional investors to retail investors. We show instead that the VC industry represents an effective tool to mitigate these worries and provides valuable support to financial market stability. Bank VC is a dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is a bank affiliated investor and 0 otherwise; Independent VC is a dummy variable which is set at 1 when firms are backed by a lead VC that is an independent investor and 0 otherwise; Age is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. Table 12 . The impact of VC's reputation on the Z"-score components: Results from OLS regressions The dependent variables are W.Cap./Asset, which is the ratio between working capital and total assets (columns I and II), Ret. Earn./Asset, which is the ratio between retained earnings and total assets (columns III and IV), EBIT/Asset, which is the ratio between EBIT and total assets (columns V and VI) and Book value/TL, which is the ratio between book value and total liabilities (columns VII and VIII). VC Reputation is a dummy variable which is set on 1 when the VC is among the top 50 VC firms in terms of funds raised five years before the VC-backed firm listing. VC Reputation_x_Stake is the product between the VC Reputation and lead VC's Stake of equity in the portfolio firm as of the listing date. Age is the Natural logarithm of the firm age; Size is the natural logarithm of the total asset; Capex is Capital expenditures normalized by total assets; GDP is the GDP growth rate between two consecutive years. State, Industry and Year dummies are included in the estimates. Estimates are derived from OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors. T-statistics are reported in round brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
